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850 F.2d 50
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
In re WILLINGTON CONVALESCENT
HOME, INC., Debtor.
Martin W. HOFFMAN, Trustee, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEPARTMENT
OF INCOME MAINTENANCE and
State of Connecticut, Department of
Health Services, Defendants–Appellees,
United States of America, Intervenor–Appellee.
In re Edward ZERA, Debtor.
Martin W. HOFFMAN, Trustee, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE SERVICES, Defendant–Appellee,
United States of America, Intervenor–Appellee.
Nos. 481, 482, Dockets 87–5021, 87–5023.  |
Argued Jan. 27, 1988.  | Decided June 15, 1988.
Chapter 7 trustee for debtors in unrelated bankruptcy
proceedings brought action against state for turnover of
certain funds and to recover funds paid state by one debtor in
allegedly preferential transfer. The United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Connecticut, Robert L. Krechevsky,
J., 39 B.R. 781, denied state's motions to dismiss, and
appeals were taken. The District Court, 72 B.R. 997 and
72 B.R. 1002, Peter C. Dorsey, J., reversed, and trustee
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Miner, Circuit Judge, held
that turnover proceedings and preference actions seeking
monetary recovery from state are outside scope of Bankruptcy
Code waiver of sovereign immunity provision, and thus are
barred by Eleventh Amendment.
Judgments of district court affirmed.
West Headnotes (3)
[1] Bankruptcy









Bankruptcy Code section, providing that,
notwithstanding assertion of sovereign
immunity, provision of Title 11 containing
term “creditor,” “entity,” or “governmental unit”
applies to governmental units, waives state
sovereign immunity only to extent necessary for
bankruptcy court to determine state's rights in
debtor's estate. Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 106,
106(c).
15 Cases that cite this headnote
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Bankruptcy Code turnover proceedings and
preference actions seeking monetary recovery
from state are outside scope of Bankruptcy
Code waiver of sovereign immunity provision,
and thus are barred by Eleventh Amendment.
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 106(c), 542(b),
547(b); U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 11.
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(Formerly 170Bk265)
Suits by Chapter 7 trustee in unrelated
bankruptcy proceedings against state for
turnover of funds owed debtor by Connecticut
for medicaid services and to recover monies
transferred to state allegedly in preferential
transfers were barred by Eleventh Amendment.
Bankr.Code, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 106(c), 542(b),
547(b); U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 11.
11 Cases that cite this headnote
Attorneys and Law Firms
*50  Martin W. Hoffman, Trustee, Hartford, Conn., in both
cases for plaintiff-appellant.
Kenneth A. Graham, Asst. Connecticut State Atty. Gen.,
Hartford, Conn. (Joseph I. Lieberman, Connecticut State
Atty. Gen., of counsel) for defendants-appellees State *51
of Conn., Dept. of Income Maintenance and Dept. of Health
Services.
Carl J. Schuman, Asst. Connecticut State Atty. Gen.,
Hartford, Conn. (Joseph I. Lieberman, Connecticut State
Atty. Gen., Jonathan L. Ensign, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel)
for defendant-appellee State of Conn., Dept. of Revenue
Services.
Tracy J. Whitaker, Atty., U.S. Justice Dept., Washington,
D.C. (Richard K. Willard, Asst. U.S. Atty. Gen., J.
Christopher Kohn, Atty., U.S. Justice Dept., Washington,
D.C., Stanley A. Twardy, Jr., U.S. Atty. D. Conn., Hartford,
Conn., of counsel) in both cases for intervenor-appellee.
Before OAKES, NEWMAN and MINER, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
MINER, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant Martin W. Hoffman, as trustee for
Willington Convalescent Home, Inc. and for Edward Zera in
two separate and unrelated Chapter 7 proceedings under the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986) (“the Code”), commenced adversarial proceedings
in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Connecticut (Krechevsky, J.) against defendants-appellees
State of Connecticut et al. (“Connecticut” or “the state”).
The separate complaints sought to recover $64,010.24 for
Willington's services under Connecticut's Medicaid Program
and to avoid and recover as a preference $2,100.62 collected
in back state sales and use taxes owed by Zera. The
bankruptcy court allowed the actions over Connecticut's
assertion of immunity from suit in the federal courts under
the eleventh amendment of the United States Constitution,
finding that Congress had abrogated the state's immunity from
these actions in § 106 of the Code, 11 U.S.C. § 106(c). 1  On
appeal to the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut (Dorsey, J.), the court reversed the bankruptcy
court and ordered that the trustee's suits be dismissed as barred
by the eleventh amendment. The trustee appeals from these
judgments. We affirm.
1 Section 106 provides in full:
(a) A governmental unit is deemed to have waived
sovereign immunity with respect to any claim against
such governmental unit that is property of the
estate and that arose out of the same transaction or
occurrence out of which such governmental unit's
claim arose.
(b) There shall be offset against an allowed claim or
interest of a governmental unit any claim against such
governmental unit that is property of the estate.
(c) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this
section and notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign
immunity—
(1) a provision of this title that contains
“creditor”, “entity”, or “governmental unit” applies
to governmental units; and
(2) a determination by the court of an issue arising
under such a provision binds governmental units.
BACKGROUND
Willington Convalescent Home, Inc. (“Willington”), a
nursing home operator, contracted with the State of
Connecticut under its Medicaid Program to admit Medicaid
eligible patients at a per diem rate, which the state determined
from cost reports that Willington submitted. After Medicaid
payments are made, the Connecticut Department of Income
Maintenance conducts field audits of the costs claimed and
may adjust retroactively a facility's per diem rate and deduct
past Medicaid payments, for costs improperly claimed, from
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present Medicaid payments for current services, see Conn.
Agencies Regs. 17–311–53. A field audit of Willington in
late 1980 revealed that its claims of $294,007.00 in real
property costs were allowable only to the extent of $22,500.00
and that Willington had received Medicaid overpayments
for five years. Accordingly, the state revised Willington's
per diem rates and began recouping the past overpayments
from current payments to Willington. Willington made a
timely request for review of the adjustment as to three of the
years pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat. § 17–311. Subsequently,
however, Willington moved to postpone indefinitely a
hearing on its request.
*52  In 1982, Willington filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
but continued operation and participation in the Medicaid
program until it closed in April 1983. Willington at no
time submitted its Medicaid contract with the state to the
bankruptcy court for assumption or rejection. Although
Willington still owed $121,408.00 at its closing, the state filed
no proof of claim.
After Willington's case was converted to Chapter 7 in
July 1983, appellant Hoffman was appointed trustee and
commenced an adversarial action—in essence, a turnover
proceeding under § 542(b) 2 —against the state to recover
$64,010.24 for Willington's Medicaid services during March
1983. The state admitted that Willington had rendered these
services, but asserted sovereign immunity from the trustee's
suit as well as the right to recoup overpayments.
2 We reject Connecticut's contention that the action
in Willington was a “related” proceeding for past
contractual money damages, and not a § 542(b)
proceeding. The section provides in pertinent part that
“an entity that owes a debt that is property of the estate
and that is matured, payable on demand, or payable
on order, shall pay such debt to, or on the order of,
the trustee,” 11 U.S.C. § 542(b). The trustee sought to
“recover a money judgment ... for services sold and
delivered on account” in “the amount of $64,010.24,”
Appendix for Willington at 6 (trustee's complaint).
Connecticut concedes that Willington rendered the
services, but claims that it has a recoupment right
which subsumes the entire payment due Willington.
See 39 B.R. at 783. The trustee's complaint, however,
“clearly alleges” that Connecticut “owe[s] a matured
debt that is property of the estate,” In re Rawson,
40 B.R. 167, 169 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1984). Although
“actions on account and debt and contract generally arise
under state law,” § 542(b) “sufficient[ly] ... arrogate[s]
the general law concepts and transform[s] them into
bankruptcy law,” Matter of Kakolewski, 29 B.R. 572, 574
(Bankr.W.D.Mo.1983) (footnote omitted). “The mere
fact that” Connecticut denies that it owes the matured
debt for Willington's services because of a recoupment
right “does not take the trustee's action outside the scope
of section 542(b),” Rawson, 40 B.R. at 169.
Likewise, Hoffman brought an adversarial proceeding against
the Connecticut Revenue Department as trustee in the Chapter
7 case of Edward Zera. Zera owed the state overdue sales
and use taxes, a renewal fee and penalties and interest in
connection with a business he owned. In September 1983, the
Revenue Department issued a tax warrant, which resulted in
payment of $2,100.62 to the state.
Zera filed for bankruptcy on October 7, 1983, and Hoffman
filed a complaint on January 5, 1984 seeking to avoid the
$2,100.62 payment as a preference, see 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), 3
and to recover the monies transferred to the state, see id.
§ 550(a). The state asserted both sovereign and eleventh
amendment immunities from suit, and moved to dismiss the
action.
3 Section 547(b) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section,
the trustee may avoid any transfer of property of the
debtor—
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by
the debtor before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made—
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing
of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date
of the filing of the petition, if such creditor, at the
time of such transfer—
(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was
insolvent at the time of such transfer;
and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such
creditor would receive if—
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
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(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to
the extent provided by the provisions of this title.
In each case, the bankruptcy court denied Connecticut's
motion to dismiss. See Matter of Willington Convalescent
Home, Inc., 39 B.R. 781, 792 (Bankr.D.Conn.1984); Matter
of Zera, No. 2–83–00754, slip op. at 14 (Bankr.D.Conn.
June 8, 1984). Judge Krechevsky concluded that Congress
had intended § 106(c) to abrogate the state's eleventh
amendment immunity from suit under 11 U.S.C. §§ 542(b),
see Willington, 39 B.R. at 786–88, and 547(b), see Zera,
slip op. at 11–14, and had authorized federal courts to hear
such suits pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b), the Code's former
jurisdictional *53  section, 4  Willington, 39 B.R. at 789;
Zera, slip op. at 10–11. The bankruptcy court found that the
Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 4, empowered
Congress to do so. See Willington, 39 B.R. at 789–91; Zera,
slip op. at 11.
4 Because § 1471(c) gave the bankruptcy courts “all
of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the
district courts,” the Supreme Court declared § 1471 an
unconstitutional delegation to the article I bankruptcy
courts of powers reserved to article III courts. See
Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598
(1982). In 1984, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. §§ 157
and 1334 to replace § 1471. In the meantime, during
which the Willington and Zera adversarial proceedings
were commenced, “[a]n emergency resolution adopted
by the United States District Judges for the District of
Connecticut temporarily restored the bankruptcy court's”
jurisdiction over civil proceedings “arising in or related
to” title 11 cases, subject to “review and control by the
district court,” Willington, 72 B.R. at 1007 n. 12.
The state appealed from both decisions to the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut. The United
States successfully moved to intervene to present argument
on the constitutionality of § 106. On appeal, the district
court rejected the bankruptcy judge's interpretation of §
106(c) and therefore did not reach the constitutional issue.
See In re Willington Convalescent Home, Inc., 72 B.R.
1002, 1012 (D.Conn.1987); In re Zera, 72 B.R. 997, 1002
(D.Conn.1987). Judge Dorsey found that the bankruptcy
court's analysis was “premised on a construction of § 106(c)
which cannot readily be harmonized with subsections (a)
and (b),” Willington, 72 B.R. at 1007. He emphasized that §
106(c) should not be read in isolation from subsections (a)
and (b), id. Furthermore, the district court reasoned, since
subsections (a) and (b) provide for limited state exposure to
compulsory or permissive counterclaims after it has filed a
proof of claim against the estate, a broad reading of subsection
(c), “permit[ting] suits against the state for retroactive money
damages irrespective of whether the state had” filed a
proof of claim, would render subsections (a) and (b) “mere
surplusage.” Id. Judge Dorsey noted that alleged waivers of
sovereign immunity “must be strictly construed in favor of the
sovereign,” id. at 1008, and the court must be “ ‘certain’ ” that
“ ‘an unequivocal expression’ ” of Congress' intent to waive
the states' immunity is “ ‘in the statute itself,’ ” id. Reviewing
“the language and legislative history [of § 106] ... as well as
the better reasoned case law,” the district court held that §
106(c) was a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that “did
not authorize a suit for retrospective money damages against
the State of Connecticut,” id. at 1012. “Because it is not
‘certain’ that Congress provided a cause of action against a
state” for retrospective monetary relief under § 542(b), id., or
§ 547(b), see Zera, 72 B.R. at 1002, the bankruptcy court had
no jurisdiction in either case to adjudicate the trustee suits.
Accordingly, the bankruptcy court's orders were reversed,
see Willington, 72 B.R. at 1012; Zera, 72 B.R. at 1002.
The trustee's action was dismissed in Willington, 72 B.R. at
1012, and in Zera was remanded to the bankruptcy court for
dismissal, 72 B.R. at 1002.
On appeal, trustee Hoffman argues that the bankruptcy court
properly held that Congress intended § 106(c) to waive state
sovereign and eleventh amendment immunities from suit
under §§ 542(b) and 547(b). We agree with the district court
that the waiver of immunity under § 106(c) extends neither
to turnover proceedings under § 542(b) nor to actions for the
recovery of funds after a preferential transfer is avoided under
§ 547(b). We therefore affirm in both cases.
DISCUSSION
The resolution of this appeal turns on how Congress
intended § 106(c) to affect a state's eleventh amendment
immunity from suit in federal court. “[T]he starting point for
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself,”
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S.
102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980), and
statutory provisions must be construed as a whole, not in
Roffer, Michael 8/5/2015
For Educational Use Only
In re Willington Convalescent Home, Inc., 850 F.2d 50 (1988)
57 USLW 2001, 17 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 1349, Bankr. L. Rep. P 72,387...
 © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5
isolation, see, e.g.,  *54  United States v. Morton, 467 U.S.
822, 828, 104 S.Ct. 2769, 2773, 81 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984). “We
may also examine the statute's legislative history to ensure
that the meaning we have ascribed to ... [its] words fits” the
legislative purpose. Pompano v. Michael Schiavone & Sons,
Inc., 680 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1039, 103 S.Ct. 454, 74 L.Ed.2d 607 (1982). Accordingly,
we look not only to the language of § 106(c), but also to that
of § 106(a) and (b), as well as to the legislative history of
§ 106, to determine whether subsection (c) waives a state's
immunity from a turnover proceeding or recovery of an
avoided preferential transfer.
1. Language of § 106
[1]  Section 106 addresses waiver of sovereign immunity
by “governmental units” in bankruptcy cases. A
governmental unit is defined to include the “United States;
[s]tate; [or] [c]ommonwealth” or “department, agency or
instrumentality” thereof. 11 U.S.C. § 101(26). Section 106(a)
provides that “[a] governmental unit is deemed to have
waived sovereign immunity with respect to any claim
against [it] ... that is property of the estate and that arose
out of the same transaction or occurrence out of which
such governmental unit's claim arose.” This subsection thus
conditions the state's “receiv[ing] a distribution from the
estate” upon waiver of immunity against any compulsory
counterclaims asserted against it “without limit” in a
bankruptcy proceeding. See H.R.Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 317 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong.
& Admin.News 5963, 6274; S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 29 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News 5787, 5815. Accordingly, § 106(a) provides
for “affirmative recovery,” see H.R.Rep. No. 595, 1978
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5963, supra ; S.Rep. No.
989, 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5787, supra,
including money judgments, see In re Inslaw, Inc., 76 B.R.
224, 234 (Bankr.D.D.C.1987).
Section 106(b) allows “any claim against [a] governmental
unit that is property of the estate” to be set off against a
governmental unit's “allowed claim or interest.” The debtor
thus has a right to a setoff against a governmental unit “to the
extent of” that unit's claim against the estate, see H.R.Rep.
No. 595, 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5963, supra ;
S.Rep. No. 989, 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 5787,
supra. Moreover, the “allowed claim” language has been
construed as incorporating § 502(a)'s rule that “[a] claim or
interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title,
is deemed allowed ” (emphasis added). See, e.g., In re Davis,
20 B.R. 519, 521 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1982). Thus, § 106(b) is not
triggered unless the governmental unit has asserted a claim
against the estate.
Section 106(c) provides that:
Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section
and notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity
—
(1) a provision of this title that contains “creditor”, “entity”,
or “governmental unit” applies to governmental units; and
(2) a determination by the court of an issue arising under
such a provision binds governmental units.
The “Except as provided in” language that introduces this
subsection unmistakably distinguishes it from subsections
(a) and (b). Thus, while (a) and (b) are not triggered
unless the government has asserted a claim against the
debtor's estate, (c) has no such requirement. Matter of
Neavear, 674 F.2d 1201, 1204 (7th Cir.1982). Moreover,
counterclaims and setoffs under (a) and (b) “may be
bottomed on non-bankruptcy statutory or common law
rights which could not otherwise form the basis for a
law suit against the [g]overnment because of the sovereign
immunity doctrine.” Matter of Community Hosp., 15 B.R.
785, 789 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.1981). Subsection (c) relates only
to issues that arise under “a provision of Title 11 ...
that contain[s] the word ‘creditor’ or the word ‘entity’
or the word ‘governmental unit.’ ” Davis, 20 B.R. at
522. The most important distinction, however, goes to
the scope of these subsections. Both § 106(a) and (b)
waive sovereign immunity as to “any claim asserted against
such governmental unit” providing for affirmative monetary
recoveries on counterclaims and for monetary recoveries
within the confines of a setoff. *55  However, § 106(c)
(2) provides only that governmental units are bound by
“a determination by the court of an issue arising under”
a provision containing one of the “triggering” terms
enumerated in subsection (c)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 106(c)(2)
(emphasis added). Thus, the plain language of § 106(c)(1)
and (2), particularly when read in light of § 106(a) and (b), 5
waives state sovereign immunity only to the extent necessary
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for the bankruptcy court to determine a state's rights in the
debtor's estate.
5 The district court relied in part on the argument that
the bankruptcy court's reading of § 106(c) rendered
subsections (a) and (b) “mere surplusage,” see 72 B.R. at
1007–08 & n. 13, 1011 (citing In re Regal Constr. Co., 18
B.R. 353 (Bankr.D.Md.1982)). However, the bankruptcy
court's interpretation leaves intact critical differences
that preclude (a) and (b) from being considered
surplusage. As observed in Matter of Neavear, 674 F.2d
1201 (7th Cir.1982), § 106(c), “unlike sections 106(a)
and (b), does not condition the waiver of sovereign
immunity upon the filing of a proof of claim,” id. at 1204.
See also Matter of McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311,
327 (7th Cir.) (rejecting surplusage argument on basis
of Neavear ), cert. denied sub nom. Edgar v. McVey
Trucking Co., 484 U.S. 895, 108 S.Ct. 227, 98 L.Ed.2d
186 (1987). Moreover, § 106(a) and (b) are not tied to
any particular Code sections, while subsection (c) applies
only to those Code provisions containing “creditor,”
“entity,” or “governmental unit.” We, therefore, do not
rely upon the surplusage argument in our analysis.
2. Legislative History of § 106
The legislative history of § 106, although not extensive,
supports this interpretation. As proposed in H.R. 8200 and
S. 2266, § 106 provided only for the waivers now embodied
in subsections (a) and (b). The House Report on H.R. 8200
stated that:
Section 106 provides for a limited
waiver of sovereign immunity in
bankruptcy cases. Though Congress
has the power to waive sovereign
immunity for the Federal government
completely in bankruptcy cases, the
policy followed here is designed
to achieve approximately the same
result that would prevail outside
of bankruptcy. Congress does not,
however, have the power to waive
sovereign immunity completely with
respect to claims of [the] bankrupt
estate against a [s]tate, though it may
exercise its bankruptcy power through
the supremacy clause to prevent or
p[r]ohibit [s]tate action that is contrary
to bankruptcy policy.
H.R. No. 595, supra, at 317, reprinted in U.S.Code Cong.
& Admin.News at 6274. Both bills “preserve[d] sovereign
immunity for tax authorities by excepting government tax
claims from the preference rules,” S.Rep. No. 1106, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1978); see H.R.Rep. No. 595, supra, at 373,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 6329.
However, in the compromise bill that resulted from H.R.
8200 and S. 2266, the present subsection (c) was added.
The floor statements explained that § 106(c) “codifies In re
Gwilliam, 519 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.[ ] 1975) and In re Dolard,
519 F.2d 282 (9th Cir.[ ] 1975)” and “compl[ies] with the
requirement in case law that an express waiver of sovereign
immunity is required in order to be effective,” 124 Cong.Rec.
H11091 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (Rep. Edwards); id. S17407
(daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (Sen. DeConcini). In both Gwilliam
and Dolard, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) asserted
that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to determine
the amount or dischargeability of unpaid federal income
taxes unless the IRS had filed a proof of claim. However,
§ 2(a)(2A), added to the Bankruptcy Act in 1966, provided
that bankruptcy courts had jurisdiction to determine “the
amount or legality of any unpaid tax.” 11 U.S.C. § 11(a)(2A)
(1966). Although the Senate Judiciary Committee Report
pertaining to this provision stated that the addition to the
Bankruptcy Act of § 2(a)(2A) did not change the requirement
that a proof of claim be filed before the bankruptcy court
exercises jurisdiction, see S.Rep. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
2442, 2452, the Gwilliam court concluded that this Report
did “not speak the consensus of Congress” and was better
ignored “rather than to injudiciously batter the expressed
language of § 11(a)(2A) to a nullity,” 519 F.2d at 410.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court
had jurisdiction to determine the amount and dischargeability
of unpaid federal taxes accruing before bankruptcy, id. at 408,
410, or after bankruptcy, *56  Dolard, 519 F.2d at 286, even
if the IRS failed to file a proof of claim.
The primary purpose, then, behind 106(c) was to codify
the results that the IRS thought were worth opposing in
Gwilliam and Dolard. See Neavear, 674 F.2d at 1204.
Although the floor statements to § 106(c) also make clear
that its applicability “is not limited to those issues, but
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permits the bankruptcy court to bind governmental units on
other matters as well,” 124 Cong.Rec., supra, at H11091,
S17407 (emphasis added), they do not indicate that the scope
of the sovereign immunity waiver was intended to extend
beyond determinations of the bankruptcy court. Instead,
these legislative statements show that governmental units are
bound not only by determinations involving the amount and
dischargeability of tax claims, but also by determinations
made under any Code section containing a triggering term.
3. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
[2]  [3]  The trustee here urges that § 106(c) can be read
to authorize a suit to recover monies from a state under
any Code provision containing a triggering term, regardless
of the type of relief sought. Because §§ 542(b) and 547(b)
both contain triggering terms and the bankruptcy court has
jurisdiction of actions pursuant to them under 28 U.S.C. §§
157(a) and 1334(b), the trustee contends that Congress clearly
abrogated a state's eleventh amendment immunity from such
suits in federal court. 6  These arguments, however, fail to
surmount the heavy burden of showing congressional waiver
of eleventh amendment immunity from actions for money
recoveries.
6 Although § 106 speaks only of “sovereign immunity,”
that term clearly encompasses eleventh amendment
immunity to the extent that the governmental unit in
question is a state. As Judge Krechevsky correctly
observed:
The term “sovereign immunity” embraces two
distinct concepts—“whether [a State] may be sued,”
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,
[465 U.S. 89, 99, 104 S.Ct. 900, 907, 79 L.Ed.2d
67 (1985),] ... or common-law sovereign immunity,
and “where [a State] may be sued,” id., or
constitutional sovereign immunity in the [e]leventh
[a]mendment.
39 B.R. at 788–89. Thus, if a bankruptcy court
can make determinations that bind a state under §
106(c), to that extent the state's eleventh amendment
immunity from suit in federal court has been waived
by § 106(c).
The eleventh amendment “limits the grant of judicial
authority in Art [icle] III” of the Constitution, Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98, 104
S.Ct. 900, 906, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), prohibiting the exercise
of federal jurisdiction over a suit against an unconsenting
state “for damages, past debts or retroactive relief of any
type,” 1 R. Rotunda, J. Nowak & J. Young, Treatise on
Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, § 2.12, at 87
(1986), particularly claims that “involve[ ] the payment of
public funds from the state treasury,” McClary v. O'Hare,
786 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir.1986); see Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. 332, 337, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1143, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355,
39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). A waiver of this immunity will be
found “only where stated ‘by the most express language or
by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will]
leave no room for any other reasonable construction,’ ”
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673, 91 S.Ct. at 1361. “Congress [must]
unequivocally express its intention to abrogate” eleventh
amendment immunity, and will do so only “by making its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,”
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242,
105 S.Ct. 3142, 3147, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985). Moreover,
statutes that purport to waive immunity are construed strictly
in the sovereign's favor.  See Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 508
(D.C.Cir.1983) (citing McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S.
25, 27, 72 S.Ct. 17, 19, 96 L.Ed. 26 (1951)), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1100, 104 S.Ct. 1593, 80 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984).
We do not believe that Congress intended to waive eleventh
amendment immunity and to authorize suits for money
damages against a state by enacting a provision that “binds”
governmental units by bankruptcy court “determination [s].”
Congress has in no way made “its intention unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute” that states are subject to
adversarial proceedings in bankruptcy that involve payment
of state funds to the estate. See  *57  Atascadero, 473 U.S.
at 246, 105 S.Ct. at 3149 (statutory authorization of suit in
federal court against any federal fund recipient insufficient to
waive state's eleventh amendment immunity). A few courts
have interpreted § 106(c) to allow adversarial actions for
money recoveries against states in bankruptcy courts in both
turnover proceedings, see In re Prime, Inc., 44 B.R. 924, 927
(Bankr.W.D.Mo.1984) (dicta); see also In re Vazquez, 788
F.2d 130, 133 (3d Cir.1986) (action to recover debt collected
in violation of § 524(a)), cert. denied sub nom. Vazquez v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare, 479 U.S. 936, 107
S.Ct. 414, 93 L.Ed.2d 365 (1986); but see In re Crum, 20
B.R. 160, 161 (Bankr.D.Idaho 1982); In re Regal Constr. Co.,
18 B.R. 353, 358 (Bankr.D.Md.1982); In re Ramos, 12 B.R.
250 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1981), as well as in preference actions,
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see Matter of McVey Trucking, Inc., 812 F.2d 311, 326–27
(7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Edgar v. McVey Trucking
Co., 484 U.S. 895, 108 S.Ct. 227, 98 L.Ed.2d 186 (1987);
In re T & D Mgt. Co., 40 B.R. 781, 789–90 (Bankr.D.Utah
1984) (dicta). However, the decisions allowing such actions
either do not analyze the issue under the Supreme Court's
standards for finding a congressional waiver of eleventh
amendment immunity or do not reflect an appreciation for the
stringency of those standards. In sum, therefore, we find that
turnover proceedings under § 542(b) and preference actions
under § 547(b) seeking monetary recoveries from a state are
outside the scope of § 106(c) and thus barred by the eleventh
amendment.
The trustee, nevertheless, argues that congressional intent
is clear that § 106(c) at least allows a state to be sued for
recovery of a preferential monetary transfer that is avoided
under § 547(b). He points to a passage from the floor
statements, concerning the applicability of § 106(c) to other
bankruptcy issues, which he asserts supports his argument:
“For example, section 106(c) permits a trustee or debtor in
possession to assert avoiding powers under title 11 against
a governmental unit; contrary language in the House report
to H.R. 8200 is thereby overruled,” 124 Cong.Rec., supra,
at H11091, S17407. This legislative history, however, does
not establish that Congress had the clear and unequivocal
intention to waive eleventh amendment immunity as to
actions against states for recovery of preferential money
transfers. Whatever questions this passage may raise about
Congress' intention as to preference actions, we must resolve
them against finding a waiver of state immunity from money
recoveries where, as in § 106(c), Congress has not made “its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,”
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242, 105 S.Ct. at 3147 (emphasis
added).
CONCLUSION
Having considered the language and legislative history of
§ 106 in light of the strict standard applicable to claims of
congressional waiver of state eleventh amendment immunity,
we hold that § 106(c) does not allow for actions pursuant
to § 542(b) or § 547(b) to recover monies from a state.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the district court.
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